IMMIGRATION
Local immigration policies

U.S. v. Minnesota, No. 25-cv-3798 (D. Minn. July 20, 2026)

The facts: The defendants in this case, including the State of Minnesota, the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, and Hennepin County, adopted and enforce so-called “sanctuary” laws and policies. The challenged laws include Minnesota Statutes, section 171.12, subdivision 7b(e), which requires those requesting driver’s license information to certify that the data will not be used for immigration purposes.

In addition, local ordinances for the cities prohibit local law enforcement from taking any action for the purpose of enforcing federal immigration law or verifying immigration status. They also restrict sharing information about a victim’s immigration status.

The Hennepin County Sheriff ’s Office issued a directive stating it would not hold individuals in custody or notify the federal government of an individual’s release based solely on an immigration detainer. This determination was consistent with an advisory opinion from the Minnesota attorney general concluding that state law prohibits Minnesota law enforcement agencies from holding someone based on an immigration detainer if the person otherwise would be released from custody.

The federal government claimed these state and local laws and policies conflict with federal laws that authorize political subdivisions to enter into agreements with the federal government to assist with immigration enforcement. In addition, the federal government argued that the laws and policies interfere with federal immigration enforcement.

The type of case: The United States claimed the local laws and policies violate the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, arguing that federal law takes precedence over conflicting state law in two ways: (1) federal law preempts them, and (2) they burden the federal government in violation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine (the constitutional protection that generally prevents state and local governments from directly regulating the federal government).

The U.S. sought a declaration that the sanctuary laws and policies are unconstitutional and an injunction preventing their enforcement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.

The issues: The district court considered whether federal law preempted the challenged state and local laws. In a similar vein, the court considered whether the federal laws violated the 10th Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule, which prevents the federal government from requiring states and local governments to carry out federal policies. The court also assessed whether the challenged state and local laws discriminated against the federal government in violation of the Supremacy Clause.

The court’s ruling: The court ruled that the preemption claims failed for several reasons. First, the court noted that the federal laws, as interpreted by the U.S., would violate the 10th Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule because they would prohibit the defendants from enacting and enforcing immigration policies involving information sharing and cooperation agreements. This would transfer power from local policymakers and deprive the defendants of control over important resources, such as employee time.

Second, the court ruled that the federal laws authorize voluntary cooperation and therefore the U.S. cannot mandate that local governments assist with immigration activities.

Finally, the court noted that the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause generally immunizes the federal government from state laws that directly regulate or discriminate against it. The court noted that the challenged state and local laws do not regulate the federal government; they regulate state and local officials. Additionally, the challenged state and local laws do not command the federal government or single it out for less favorable treatment.

What this means for cities: Cities have the right to determine whether to assist with federal immigration enforcement, and the federal government cannot force cities to cooperate with immigration activities.

CRIMINAL LAW
Reckless investigation

Carnes v. Blehm, No. 25-1490 (8th Cir. Ct. App. July 7, 2026)

The facts: In October 2003, Larry White was shot and killed in Kansas City, Missouri. There was no physical evidence indicating he was shot at close range.

During the investigation, officers interviewed Wendy Lockett, who told them that she saw a Black man running from two Black males who were firing guns. Lockett provided no additional physical description of the shooters or the guns and did not identify the shooter by name.

Later, the prosecutor interviewed Lorianne Morrow, who stated that two men, neither of whom was Keith Carnes, were shooting at White. Morrow alleges that the prosecutor told her that if she did not identify Carnes as the shooter, he would plant drugs on her and charge her with drug possession, which would cause her to lose custody of her children. Morrow later told detectives that Carnes was one of the men shooting at White and that Carnes eventually turned White over and shot him five more times.

Police later interviewed Lockett again while she was under the influence of controlled substances. At that time, Lockett told police that Carnes was shooting at White and eventually shot White in the head after he collapsed.

Carnes was convicted of first-degree murder. Morrow and Lockett later recanted their testimony. After serving 17 years of a life sentence, Carnes was released from prison when the Missouri Supreme Court granted habeas relief because the state failed to disclose material evidence.

The type of case: After being released from prison, Carnes filed a claim against the police officers and prosecutor for reckless investigation. The district court denied the state’s motions for summary judgment (a court-ordered judgment without a trial) and the case proceeded to a trial.

The issues: The court reviewed whether any immunity defenses protected the officers from the claim of reckless investigation.

The court’s ruling: First, the court considered whether qualified immunity would shield the officials from the claim. Qualified immunity applies unless the plaintiff shows (1) a violation of a constitutional right and (2) that the officials’ conduct violated a clearly established right.

To rise to the level of a constitutional violation based on inadequate investigation, a plaintiff must show that the law enforcement officer’s failure to investigate was intentional or reckless and shocked the conscience. The court ruled that a reasonable fact-finder could determine that the detectives acted recklessly by uncritically accepting witness testimony that contradicted the physical evidence and potentially coercing the witnesses.

The court next reviewed the prosecutor’s actions and determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he suppressed and fabricated evidence before there was probable cause to arrest Carnes. Therefore, the district court correctly denied the prosecutor’s motions for summary judgment.

What this means for cities: Prosecutors and investigators should take steps to ensure interviews are conducted in a manner free of coercion.

LAND USE
Americans with Disabilities Act

Audette v. Lake of the Woods County, 183 F.4th 627 (8th Cir. 2026)

The facts: The Audettes own a home on Lake of the Woods. Without prior approval from the county, they poured a concrete ramp from their property to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark. They attempted to obtain a post-construction conditional use permit (CUP). Although the planning commission recommended approval with conditions, the county board denied the permit and ordered the Audettes to restore the property by a deadline.

Two weeks after that deadline, the Audettes submitted an application seeking to keep the concrete work, claiming it was necessary to provide Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant access for a family member. They proposed several options to comply with the act but were denied. The Audettes did not restore the property, and the construction remained in violation of the county’s order.

The type of case: The Audettes sued the county alleging discrimination under the ADA. The district court determined that the Audettes missed their opportunity to request an accommodation by violating the county’s instructions and dismissed the case.

The issues: The court reviewed whether the county was required to accommodate the Audettes’ ramp under Title II of the ADA.

The court’s ruling: Title II of the ADA provides that no qualified individual with a disability may be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or discriminated against in the services, programs, or activities of a public entity. A public entity must make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to avoid discrimination, unless it shows that the modification would alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.

To establish an ADA violation, an individual with a disability must show exclusion or discrimination because of that disability. Failing to make reasonable accommodations can constitute discrimination.

The court noted that the county’s ordinance allows a person with a disability to construct a walkway to the lake. However, the Audettes never sought permission for such a walkway and instead built a large boat ramp. The court ruled that the Audettes should have known the ramp violated the county ordinance and should have requested a reasonable accommodation as provided by the ordinance.

What this means for cities: Cities should clearly communicate their requirements for permits and reasonable accommodations, and provide a process for individuals with disabilities to request accommodations when needed.

Written by Kyle Hartnett, assistant research manager with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: [email protected] or (651) 215-4084.