CRIMINAL LAW
Chemical test refusal

State of Minnesota v. Lueck, No. A24-0250 (Minn. Nov. 12, 2025)

The facts: Brian Russell Lueck was involved in a head-on collision during a snowstorm after attempting to pass several vehicles, including a snowplow. Following the accident, law enforcement detained Lueck on suspicion of driving while impaired. Officers obtained a search warrant authorizing a blood test. Lueck refused to submit to both blood and urine testing. As a result, he was charged with first-degree test refusal. The district court denied his motion to suppress the refusal evidence and dismiss the charge, and the court of appeals affirmed that decision.

The type of case: Lueck argued that his refusal could not support the test-refusal charge because the Fourth Amendment prohibited it. He contended that Minnesota law required him to refuse both a blood test and a urine test to be charged with test refusal, but police had only obtained a warrant for a blood test, not a urine test.

The issue: The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether Minnesota’s test-refusal statue is constitutional as applied when law enforcement obtains a warrant authorizing only one type of chemical test, either blood or urine, and whether offering a test that is not authorized by the warrant implicates Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The court’s ruling: The court ruled that the plain language of Minnesota’s test-refusal statute creates a crime when a person refuses a chemical test that has been authorized by a warrant. The warrant dictates which test an officer may direct the individual take.

The court explained that when a warrant authorizes either a blood test or a urine test, an officer must offer both tests. However, when a warrant authorizes only one type of test, officers are not required to offer the other test in order to sustain a test-refusal conviction. Refusal of the test authorized by the warrant is sufficient.

What this means for cities: When obtaining chemical tests in impaired-driving investigations, officers should follow the specific terms of the warrant. A refusal of the authorized test can support a test-refusal charge, even if the other types of tests are not offered.

CODE ENFORCEMENT
Regulatory taking

reVamped LLC, v. City of Pipestone, No. 25-1076 (8th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025)

The facts: The Calument Inn in Pipestone had a history of disrepair that created safety risks, including windows falling from the building, a 15-pound stone detaching from the structure, and numerous fire code violations.

From November 2019 through March 2020, the City of Pipestone’s building administrator, the fire marshal, and health inspector informed the inn’s owner of multiple violations. On March 9, 2020, the building administrator ordered the inn to close until fire code violations and other safety issues that endangered life were resolved. The inn addressed the issues by November 2020 and resumed operations. The business continued operating until May 2022 when it closed permanently.

The type of case: The inn’s owners sued the city and the building administrator, alleging that the closure order violated their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and amounted to an uncompensated regulatory taking (regulations imposed that restrict an owner’s ability to use their property) in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial) in favor of the city and the building administrator. The inn owners appealed.

The issues: The court considered whether the temporary closure of the inn violated the owners’ procedural due process rights and whether the temporary closure constituted a regulatory taking.

The court’s ruling: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court concluded that the building administrator acted within his authority under the Minnesota State Building Code, which requires a building official to vacate a building that is structurally unsafe or dangerous to human life.

The court noted that the language of the state building code was sufficiently specific to reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property rights, which is mistaken or unfair taking of someone’s possessions or legal entitlements by the government without following proper rules or procedures.

It also noted that the inn owners had three available avenues to appeal the closure order: the City Council, the Minnesota State Building Code Appeals Board, and a certiorari review (seeking judicial review of a decision of a lower court or government agency). Because the owners did not pursue any of those options, they could not claim a violation of their due process rights.

The court further deferred to the building administrator’s determination that the building posed a safety risk and that swift action was necessary to protect the public. Finally, the court held that the temporary closure did not amount to a regulatory taking. The city’s lawful exercise of its police power to protect public health and safety generally does not constitute a taking requiring compensation.

What this means for cities: Cities have the authority to protect public health and safety through enforcement of the state building code and fire code. When issuing a closure order, cities should ensure that the action is authorized by those codes and supported by documented safety concerns.

STATUTORY IMMUNITY
Mandatory reporter

Thormodson, et al. v Zehnder, No. 83-CV-24-80 (Minn. App., Dec. 15, 2025)

The facts: The Thormodsons are the guardians of B.O., who was 17 years old during the relevant time period. B.O. has limited mobility and requires assistance with daily activities, including bathing and toileting. During the school day, B.O. received assistance from Kathryn Rae Zehnder, a paraprofessional at B.O.’s school. While helping B.O. after a shower, Zehnder saw what she believed was a bruise on B.O.’s buttocks. Two days later, Zehnder sought general advice from a colleague about whether she was required to file a report with authorities, but she did not discuss the details of what she had observed. Zehnder then contacted authorities and made a confidential report concerning B.O. in accordance with Minnesota’s Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors Act (RMMA). The county human services agency opened a family assessment and later closed it without further action.

The type of case: The Thormodsons filed a complaint against Zehnder, alleging that she knowingly made a false report of child abuse or neglect. The claim arose after Zehnder’s identity was disclosed during discovery, which the Thormodsons argued occurred because of ineffective redaction. Zehnder moved for summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial), asserting statutory immunity as a mandatory reporter under the RMMA. The district court granted her motion.

The issue: Does the RMMA extend immunity to a person who makes a report in good faith, even if the report is not made immediately?

The court’s ruling: Although the RMMA generally requires mandatory reporters to report maltreatment to designated authorities within 24 hours, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, determining that a failure to report within that time frame does not preclude immunity.

The court concluded that the RMMA provides immunity from liability for reporting when two conditions are met: (1) the person makes a report under the RMMA, and (2) the person does so in good faith.

The court noted that immunity may be lost if a report is made to someone other than a local welfare agency, police department, or sheriff. However, the court found that Zehnder did not discuss the details of her observations with anyone other than county officials.

In addition, the court concluded that even if Zehnder’s report did not qualify as a mandated report because it was not made within 24 hours, it still qualified as a voluntary report. Immunity under the RMMA extends to voluntary reports made in good faith.

What this means for cities: City employees who report suspected maltreatment to the designated authorities under the RMMA are immune from liability if they act in good faith, even if the report is not made immediately.

Written by Kyle Hartnett, assistant research manager with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: [email protected] or (651) 215-4084.