ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Clean Water Act

Michael and Chantell Sackett purchased property near Priest Lake, Idaho, and began backfilling the property with dirt to prepare it for building a home. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Sacketts backfilling the property violated the Clean Water Act (CWA), which prohibits discharging pollutants into “waters of the United States” (WOTUS). The EPA determined this was a violation because the property was near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake.

The Sacketts sued, alleging their property did not constitute WOTUS. The district court granted summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial) for the EPA and the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed, holding the CWA covers wetlands with an ecologically significant connection to traditional navigable waters and that the Sacketts’ wetlands meet that standard.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, finding that to qualify as WOTUS subject to the CWA, wetlands must be indistinguishably part of a body of water that itself constitutes “waters” under the CWA. The Supreme Court did not defer to the EPA’s interpretation that included wetlands adjacent to covered waters if the wetlands possessed significant link to traditional navigable waters. Rather, the Supreme Court held the CWA extends only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with “waters” of the United States — i.e., with a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters, making it difficult to determine where the water ends and the wetland begins. Applying these standards, the Supreme Court found the Sacketts’ property does not constitute wetlands under the CWA.

Sackett v. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 143 S. Ct. 1322 (2023).

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Title VII

Gerald Groff is a Christian and took a mail delivery job with the United States Postal Service (USPS). His religious beliefs dictate that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest. Originally, Groff ’s position did not involve Sunday work, but that changed after USPS began Sunday deliveries for Amazon. To avoid the requirement to work Sundays on rotation, Groff transferred to a rural USPS station that did not make Sunday deliveries. After Amazon deliveries began at that station, Groff remained unwilling to work Sundays and USPS redistributed his deliveries to other staff. Groff received progressive discipline for failing to work on Sundays, and he eventually resigned.

Groff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS’s] business.” The district court granted summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial) to USPS and the Third Circuit Court affirmed based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison (432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113), which it interpreted to mean “that requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimis cost’ [insignificant cost] to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.” The Third Circuit found the de minimis cost standard was met and exempting Groff from Sunday work had “imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workflow, and diminished employee morale.”

The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision, clarifying that under Hardison, an “undue hardship is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.” This is a fact-specific inquiry that must consider “all relevant factors in the case at hand, including the accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, ‘size and operating cost of [an] employer.’” The case was sent back to the lower courts to apply the standard the Supreme Court articulated.

Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023).

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Duty Disability

Todd Weeres worked as a patrol officer for the City of Waite Park beginning in 1998. During his employment, Weeres was exposed to many traumatic events, but a 2010 encounter with an armed suspect resulted in Weeres having nightmares and mental health symptoms that affected his ability to perform the job. Weeres was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and received treatment for several months, but discontinued treatment because he was concerned about stigma and job security. When his symptoms worsened in February 2019, he was again diagnosed with PTSD and was restricted from working as a police officer. Weeres later applied to the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA) for duty-disability benefits and was found totally disabled from his role as a patrol officer. Weeres’ employment was terminated, and PERA approved his application for duty-disability benefits. The city requested a contested-case hearing.

Following the contested case hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a decision determining Weeres did not have a duty disability and the city was not required to provide continuing health insurance coverage to him. The ALJ found Weeres had not met his burden to prove the condition could be expected to persist for a year or that the condition bore the necessary causal connection to his performance of inherently dangerous duties as a police officer. In the decision, the ALJ relied heavily on a doctor’s criticisms of the PTSD diagnoses by others and reasoned that, because of shortcomings in those PTSD diagnoses, the record was insufficient to support an inference that Weeres had a duty disability.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ’s decision, finding it based on an error of law because the ALJ improperly assigned the burden of proof to Weeres. Under administrative rules governing contested cases, the party proposing an action be taken must prove the facts with evidence, unless the substantive law provides a different burden or standard. In this case, Minnesota Statutes, section 299A.465 does not provide a burden of proof. Because the city sought the contested case hearing, it has the burden to prove the employee did not suffer a duty disability within the meaning of Minnesota Statutes, section 353.01, subdivision 41. The court of appeals also found the ALJ’s reliance on one doctor’s testimony was unreasonable given the entire record, and the ALJ’s failure to address all the relevant evidence lent support to the conclusion that the decision was the product of will rather than judgment.

City of Waite Park v. Weeres, A22-0956 (Minn. Ct. App. June 12, 2023) (nonprecedential opinion).

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES
Official Immunity

Brent LaFavor was a snowplow driver for the City of Minneapolis. While operating a snowplow, he heard a noise and briefly looked to see if he had hit something or if the plow was damaged — neither occurred. However, after the momentary distraction, he looked back at the road and saw he had driven past a stop sign. LaFavor slowed down but did not come to an immediate stop. When he caught sight of Donald Steele’s vehicle, he attempted to clear the intersection. When Steele realized the plow was not stopping, he braked and swerved around the snowplow, colliding into the rear wheels of the plow. Steele brought a negligence action against LaFavor and the city.

The district court granted motion for summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial) and dismissed the matter with prejudice, meaning the plaintiff cannot refile the same claim. It determined an official-immunity defense was available to LaFavor because his failure to stop at the stop sign was a discretionary action, and Steele did not argue LaFavor acted willfully or maliciously. The district court also concluded the city was entitled to vicarious official immunity and declined to determine whether statutory immunity applied.

Steele appealed, arguing because LaFavor was unaware of the stop sign until it was too late, LaFavor exercised no discretionary decision-making about his operation of the plow, policy implementation, or safety associated with his failure to stop at the stop sign. The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed, finding LaFavor’s action was discretionary, not mandated or prescribed by a legal authority or law, because he applied the brakes to slow down and considered pressing the brakes harder but did not for fear of an accident. LaFavor’s decision to continue driving while investigating the cause of the thud was the reason LaFavor was not aware of the stop sign until he was far enough into the intersection to be faced with the additional decision to slow down or jam the brakes. These decisions required the exercise of independent judgment to fulfill the objective of snow removal in what LaFavor perceived to be the safest manner possible given the road conditions and limited visibility.

Steele also argued the city could not claim official immunity because “the exercise of judgment and discretion requires the existence of an identifiable factor,” that factor being the cause of the loud noise distracting LaFavor. The court found no authority in support of Steele’s argument and found the cause of the noise was not a material fact. The fact that the thud occurred caused LaFavor to weigh considerations and make discretionary decisions leading up to the choice not to stop at the stop sign. Thus, application of official immunity was appropriate and the court affirmed the district court’s decision.

Steele v. LaFavor, A22-1714 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2023) (nonprecedential opinion).

Written by Aisia Davis, research attorney with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: adavis@lmc.org or (651) 281-1271.