SUBDIVISION STATUTE
Park dedication fees

Almir Puce applied to the City of Burnsville to redevelop his residential parcel for commercial use as an automobile dealership and a bakery/coffee shop. Puce objected to the imposition of a park dedication fee, arguing “no need whatsoever will be created for parks by this proposed development.” The city planning commission recommended a park dedication fee of $37,804; however, the city later recalculated and reduced the fee to $11,700.

To comply with the subdivision statute (Minnesota Statutes, section 462.358), cities may impose park dedication fees rather than requiring land dedication for public use. The fee may be “based on the average fair market value of the unplatted land for which park fees have not already been paid.” The subdivision statute also provides “[t]here must be an essential nexus between the fees … and the municipal purpose sought to be achieved by the fee,” and “[t]he fee … must bear a rough proportionality to the need created by the proposed subdivision or development.”

Puce sued, claiming in part that the city’s application of its ordinance did not comply with the subdivision statute and had resulted in an unconstitutional taking of his property in violation of state and federal constitutional provisions. The district court ruled in the city’s favor, upholding the park dedication fee. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, concluding the city’s imposition of the park dedication fee did not comply with the subdivision statute, based on the lack of the city’s “individualized determination” of the proposed development’s impact on city parkland.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and returned the case to the district court, finding the city had a sufficient legal and factual basis under the subdivision statute to impose the park dedication fee. The court held the city made an individualized determination and complied with the “rough proportionality” requirement of the subdivision statute when it recalculated the fee using the fair market value of his specific property, rather than applying the city’s blanket dedication formula that is based on the average cost per acre by zoning district.

The court further held the city complied with the subdivision statute as it made a reasonable determination that it will need to acquire and develop or improve a reasonable portion of land due to the approval of a subdivision before imposing a park dedication fee. Citing the city’s comprehensive plan, which requires 5% of the gross land area of the development to maintain open space, the court ruled the city acted reasonably.

Puce v. City of Burnsville, N.W.2d (Minn. 2023). Note: The League filed an amicus brief in Burnsville’s support.

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Duty disability

Amy Kriegshauser was a firefighter and paramedic concurrently employed by the cities of Hugo and White Bear Lake (WBL). Through WBL, Kriegshauser received health insurance and contributed to the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA) Police and Fire Plan. The cities have a Reciprocal Emergency Services Agreement that provides emergency services and automatic response to reported structure and building fires for residents, and provides equipment, personnel, and other resources to both departments.

Kriegshauser injured her knee and femur during a call placed to both Hugo’s paid on-call firefighters and firefighters from neighboring cities in accordance with the Reciprocal Emergency Services Agreement. Kriegshauser’s pagers from both Hugo and WBL alerted her, but she answered the Hugo page, in part to satisfy her 25% call-response requirement, and arrived at the fire scene in Hugo gear and in a Hugo fire truck. A few days after the fire, Kriegshauser filed a first report of injury with Hugo.

Hugo accepted liability and provided Kriegshauser with workers’ compensation benefits. Kriegshauser underwent multiple knee surgeries, various rehabilitation efforts, and a full knee replacement. She attempted to return to work as a WBL firefighter, but she experienced pain and swelling preventing her from performing her job. In April 2020, WBL terminated Kriegshauser’s employment. She filed a PERA application for duty disability benefits and after appealing their initial determination for regular disability benefits, PERA awarded Kriegshauser duty disability benefits and notified WBL of its obligation to provide ongoing health insurance benefits.

WBL challenged the PERA determination, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined WBL failed to prove Kriegshauser did not sustain a duty disability. As a result, WBL was “responsible for continuing to provide health insurance coverage for [Kriegshauser] and her dependents and for continuing to pay its contribution for that coverage pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 299A.465.” WBL appealed the ALJ’s decision.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s decision, finding the duty disability statute (Minnesota Statutes, section 353.01) ambiguous regarding the interpretation of “duties that are specific to the positions covered by” the plan. When a statute is ambiguous, appellate courts generally defer to the interpretation of an agency charged with administering the statute. In this case, the court deferred to PERA’s interpretation because it was reasonable and held Kriegshauser’s injury qualifies as a duty disability.

There is no dispute WBL provided health coverage at the time of the injury as Kriegshauser’s employer. Minnesota Statutes, section 299A.465, subdivision 1(c), requires a firefighter’s employer to continue to provide health coverage for the firefighter and the firefighter’s dependents if the firefighter was receiving dependent coverage at the time of the injury under the employer’s group health plan. The court interpreted “employer shall continue to provide health coverage” as the employer that provided health coverage at the time of the injury. This means there is no other “employer,” except for WBL that could continue to provide Kriegshauser with health insurance coverage. Thus, the court held the ALJ correctly identified WBL as Kriegshauser’s employer responsible for providing continuing health coverage.

City of White Bear Lake v. Kriegshauser, No. A23-0005 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2023) (nonprecedential opinion). Note: The League filed an amicus brief in White Bear Lake’s support.

CRIMINAL LAW
Firearm regulation

The State of Minnesota charged Corey Lynden Stone with the unlawful possession of a firearm after searching a vehicle he was in and discovering a backpack containing parts for an unassembled shotgun. Stone agreed he had previously been convicted of a “crime of violence” and was therefore prohibited from the possession of a “firearm” under Minnesota Statutes, section 609.165, which does not contain a definition for the term “firearm.” A jury found Stone guilty, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction. Stone appealed his conviction, claiming in part “an incomplete collection of disassembled component firearm parts” is not a “firearm” within the meaning of section 609.165. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision upholding Stone’s conviction and found that a group of unassembled shotgun parts can constitute a firearm within the meaning of section 609.165, so long as it is an instrument designed for attack or defense that expels a projectile by some explosive force. The evidence that Stone possessed shotgun parts was sufficient to establish he possessed a firearm, even if the shotgun was disassembled and parts were missing.

State v. Stone, N.W.2d (Minn. 2023).

LAND USE
Orderly annexation

Albert Lea Township and the City of Albert Lea published a notice of intent and later a joint resolution to designate an area of the township for orderly annexation pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 414.0325, including a 7.6-acre parcel owned by Trails Truck & Travel Plaza LLC (Trails). Trails filed an objection letter with the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and requested a hearing. OAH scheduled a telephone conference between the two parties. Following the conference, OAH issued an order and memorandum approving the annexation and declined to comment. Trails appealed the order to district court. The district court held a status conference, later vacated the annexation order, and remanded the case back to OAH. The city appealed this decision.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, finding the joint resolution satisfied the criteria in the orderly annexation statute. Because statutory timelines providing for a hearing and for approval are incompatible when a hearing could not be held before approval of the annexation, the court reasoned the statutes must be interpreted to harmonize and give effect to all provisions. Therefore, the court found the only reasonable interpretation of the orderly annexation statute is that subdivision 2 (establishing hearing timeframes) and subdivision 3 (presuming discretion to deny annexation) do not apply to a joint resolution that satisfies the criteria of subdivision 1(h). Put differently, OAH was not required to hold a hearing under subdivision 2 or evaluate the factors identified in subdivision 3. Ultimately, the court held a review by OAH of a joint resolution for annexation is limited to determining satisfaction of the conditions and procedural requirements in section 414.0325, subdivisions 1 and 1b.

Trails Truck & Travel Plaza, LLC v. Albert Lea Twp., No. A23- 0048 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2023).

Written by Aisia Davis, research attorney with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: research@lmc.org or (651) 281-1271.