CRIMINAL LAW
Firearm regulation

The State of Minnesota charged Corey Lynden Stone with the unlawful possession of a firearm after searching a vehicle he was in and discovering a backpack containing parts for an unassembled shotgun. Stone agreed that he had previously been convicted of a “crime of violence” and was therefore prohibited from the possession of a “firearm” under Section 609.165 of Minnesota Statutes, which does not contain a definition for the term “firearm.” A jury found Stone guilty as charged, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction. Stone appealed his conviction, claiming in part that “an incomplete collection of disassembled component firearm parts” is not a “firearm” within the meaning of Section 609.165. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Stone’s conviction and ruled that a group of unassembled shotgun parts can constitute a firearm within the meaning of Section 609.165, so long as it is possible to assemble the parts into a firearm, as this term has been defined in previous court decisions.

State v. Stone, N.W.2d (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2022).

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Common-interest doctrine

Energy Policy Advocates (EPA), a nonprofit advocacy organization, submitted a data request to the Office of the Attorney General (AGO) under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, seeking data regarding the AGO’s actions related to climate change. The AGO determined that there was no responsive public data. The AGO cited in part (as a basis for the nondisclosure of data) the common-interest doctrine, which generally operates as an exception to the waiver of the attorney-client privilege if privileged information is disclosed to a third party with a common legal interest. The EPA filed a lawsuit, seeking to compel the AGO to disclose the requested data. The AGO submitted a privilege log (document describing the withheld data) to the district court. The AGO then moved for the lawsuit’s dismissal, and the district court granted the AGO’s motion. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, and ruled in part that the common- interest doctrine does not apply in Minnesota state courts because neither the Legislature nor the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized it. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and officially recognized the common-interest doctrine. The Supreme Court clarified that the common-interest doctrine applies when: (1) two or more parties, (2) represented by separate lawyers, (3) have a common legal interest, (4) in a litigated or non-litigated matter, (5) the parties agree to exchange information concerning the matter, and (6) they make an otherwise privileged communication in furtherance of formulating a joint legal strategy. The Supreme Court cautioned that a qualifying common interest must be a legal interest, and that a purely commercial, political, or policy interest is insufficient.

Energy Policy Advocates v. Ellison, 980 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 2022). Note: The League filed an amicus brief in the AGO’s support.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First Amendment

Raymond Redlich and Christopher Ohnimus, a pastor and his assistant, distributed food to homeless people in the City of St. Louis. A police officer observed them distributing bologna sandwiches that were stored in a cooler with no ice and issued each a citation for violating a city ordinance that requires a permit for the distribution of “potentially dangerous food.” The city ultimately elected not to pursue the citations. Redlich and Ohnimus sued the city, claiming that its enforcement of the ordinance violated their rights to the free exercise of religion and to free expression under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The men claimed that they have a religious duty to provide food, drink, and spiritual support for those in need. While the litigation was pending, the city amended its code to include a “Charitable Feeding Temporary Food Permit” designed for those who wish to help feed the public free of charge. The federal district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment (court-issued judgment without a trial). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and ruled that a city regulation does not violate a person’s First Amendment rights under the following circumstances: (1) if it is within the city’s constitutional power; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free suppression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The court of appeals reasoned that a municipality has a substantial interest in preventing the spread of illness or disease among its citizens, including its homeless population, and that the ordinance at issue furthers that substantial interest and is narrowly tailored such that, without the regulation, that interest would be achieved less effectively.

Raymond Redlich v. City of St. Louis, 51 F.4th 283 (8th Cir. 2022).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Dog ordinance

The City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, adopted an ordinance prohibiting the dog breed of pit bulls. Rachel Danker and several other dog owners brought a Section 1983 claim under the federal Civil Rights Act, claiming that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and violates their rights under the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States Constitution. The federal district court granted summary judgment (court-ordered judgment without a trial) in the city’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, ruling that the ordinance is rationally related to the city’s legitimate governmental interest of protecting the public health and safety. The court of appeals reasoned that, even if the ordinance’s method for identifying a dog’s breed through visual inspection was imperfect, the ordinance promotes the city’s interest in protecting the community health and safety by reducing dog bites. The city had produced evidence showing that pit bulls had accounted for a disproportionate number of dog bites in the city during a two-year period, that the number of dog bites declined after ordinance’s adoption, and that evidence supports the conclusion that there is some relationship between a dog’s genetics and its behavior. The court of appeals also concluded that, because the dog owners failed to disprove every conceivable basis for the ordinance’s rationality, the ordinance satisfied the applicable rational basis review and substantive due process analysis.

Danker v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, F.4th (8th Cir. 2022). Note: Minnesota Statutes Section 347.51, subd. 8 prohibits Minnesota cities from adopting ordinances that regulate dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs based solely on the dog’s breed.

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Race discrimination

Christopher Thompson, a terminated police officer for the University of Arkansas Police Department sued the board of trustees and the department’s chief, Raymond Ottman, asserting claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Thompson is African American, and Ottman is Caucasian. On Aug. 24, Officer Thompson had responded to a call from a resident assistant reporting an intoxicated man in a dormitory room who was passed out and foaming at the mouth. Two female students were also in the room. Thompson questioned the female students outside the room for about 20 minutes. He never attempted to check the man’s vital signs or administer other first aid. At one point, the resident assistant asked if Thompson was going to attend to the man. Thompson simply responded that paramedics were on the way. The paramedics eventually arrived and transported the man to a local hospital. A few days later, the resident assistant met with Chief Ottman to express concerns about Thompson’s response to the incident. Ottman reviewed Thompson’s body-camera footage and determined that Thompson’s response warranted his termination. On Sept. 1, Thompson was dismissed for cause. The dismissal letter focused on the Aug. 24 incident, noting that Thompson “failed to approach or attend to the victim,” “check for a medical alert ID,” “check vital signs,” and “provide first aid.” The federal district court granted a motion for summary judgment (court-issued judgment without a trial) in favor of Ottman and the board of trustees. Thompson appealed the district court’s decision regarding his claim of retaliation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, ruling that the reasons for Thompson’s dismissal were legitimate, and that Thompson failed to raise a genuine doubt as to whether the Aug. 24 incident was a pretext basis for his dismissal.

Thompson v. University of Arkansas Board of Trustees, 52 F.4th 1039 (8th Cir. 2022).

Written by Susan Naughton, research attorney with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: snaughto@lmc.org or (651) 281-1232.